Introduction
The question as to whether "the defence of necessity" may be invoked by a State as a ground for justifying its otherwise internationally wrongful act has long been in controversy. Quite a few eminent writers have been opposed to or sceptical about the defence of necessity.1 This is mainly because of the potential for its abuse as it being a pretext for wrongful conduct. Given the lack of enforceability of international legal norms, particularly within the boundaries of a sovereign State, this concern is understandable.
However, an objection can be raised against this opposition. It may sound paradoxical, but the defence of necessity is expected to operate to ensure the rule of law in case of emergency. Without the defence of necessity in international law, States in emergencies may, especially from the realist point of view, choose inevitably to make light of or ignore international legal rules which prohibit dealing with appropriate situations. In such cases, there is a danger that the maxim "Necessitas non habet legem" will turn into reality. Given this concern, quite a few scholars believe that an international rule of necessity is needed to ensure that States remain willing to adhere to rules of international law, even when in the midst of an emergency.2
As Professor Ryuichi Ida postulated, the normativity of international law in its broader sense depends on its effectiveness, that is, the degree to which States actually comply with international law.3 He also argues that, for certain norms to be effective, compliance consciousness is extremely important. Combining these principles, Professor Ida would argue that a rule of necessity defence may actually contribute to the preservation of the purpose of international law, by incentivising States to comply, even during an emergency.
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